perimeters, was scheduled for installation at U-Tapao RTNAF in late 1971.

In November, PACAF directed that the tape be held for possible diversion to vulnerable Vietnam bases. Four days after the January 1972 attack, 13AF directed that the tape still at U-Tapao RTNAF be employed in that base's defense. Thirteenth Air Force further indicated that the tape sent to Vietnam would either be replaced or redirected back to U-Tapao.

Construction projects, such as fence barriers, defensive bunkers, and observation towers, frequently had to await the completion of higher-priority civil engineering work orders. The response to this difficulty often was an enormous SP self-help effort. Probably well over 50 percent of all defensive structures in Thailand were constructed solely by security police personnel. Higher headquarters, while commending such vigorous efforts, cautioned the field not to rely exclusively on self-help but to utilize regular Air Force supply and civil engineering channels whenever possible.

The U.S. Embassy's ROE also provided several limitations on physical defenses. The original 1968 ROE prohibited the use of flareships. This was changed in 1969, and flare drops and the use of 81mm mortars were approved for illumination as long as the "trash" didn't impact outside the base. Soil sterilization and herbicide use was also approved in 1969, but these were subject to extensive coordination with local RTG authorities and final permission from the Embassy. They could only be used on areas within the perimeter and under no circumstances could the vegetation control agents be used to clear areas of observation to fire off-base. This lengthy